



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Teleological, Divine Necessity: Ontological, and Philosophical, Faith indicate the course of the discussion in the first 120 pages. Then follow five chapters in which the doubts and queries suggested by the existence of evil, optimism and progress, miracle and its real nature, the mystery of death and the question of immortality, are handled with equal candor and ability. Objections and difficulties are fairly stated, and whatever weight can be justly conceded to them is conceded. The issue of the inquiries is the conclusion that faith in the supreme moral personality is not undermined by the fact of moral evil or by the fact of death, or by what is left of unfathomed mystery in the moral and providential administration of the world. To the pages (142-240) in which this luminous discussion is conducted we must refer the reader who would gain an adequate knowledge of its contents and a due impression of its soundness and value.

YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

ESQUISSE D'UNE PHILOSOPHIE DE LA RELIGION D'APRÈS LA PSYCHOLOGIE ET L'HISTOIRE. Par AUGUSTE SABATIER, Professeur de l'Université de Paris, Doyen de la Faculté de Théologie Protestante. Paris: Fischbacher, 1897. Pp. xvi + 415, 8vo. Fr. 7.50.

THIS is not by any means a great book, nevertheless it is a supremely interesting one. For the production of a work of the former class the times must be ripe, the age must coöperate with the author. A period of transition favors the appearance of a suggestive book, especially in so far as it induces a writer to reproduce semi-consciously the prevailing conflict of opinion or absence of clear constructive tendency.

Philosophy of religion is at present passing through that kind of change which commonly accompanies growth. This department of inquiry numbers today little more than sixty years. With the appearance of Hegel's Lectures, in 1832, it may be said to have finally dispossessed its ancestor, natural theology. For rather more than a generation thereafter Hegelian ideas and methods practically usurped the field; and one might say that the publication of Professor Otto Pfleiderer's classical work, in 1868, marked the beginning of the end of this epoch. Since then Hegelian principles have doubtless passed over into Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, and, in this new environment, have contrived to preserve their authority till within the last decade. But during this generation, which may be termed the

second epoch of philosophy of religion, a parallel movement has been in rapid progress. Facts of which Hegel knew nothing, information that his followers tend only too often to minimize or miss, have come to light. The labors of McLennan, Maine, and Robertson Smith, of Professor Max Müller, Mr. Tylor, Mr. Spencer, Mr. Andrew Lang, Mr. J. G. Frazer, and Mr. F. B. Jevons—to mention the names of British writers only—have intervened. The knowledge of ancient religions and civilizations has been vastly extended, like the information concerning primitive man and his customs; psychology has acquired a new importance; changed methods of investigation have wholly altered the outlook. As a result, an almost unanimous tendency to doubt the validity and usefulness of metaphysical formalism has gradually revealed itself. Thinkers begin to see that the entire field must be restudied without prejudice, and especially without the preconceptions incident to an *a priori* scheme which is brought to the facts and forced upon them willy-nilly. Further, it is becoming plainer and plainer that religion cannot be viewed as an intellectual phenomenon exclusively. Its roots extend, not only to the mind of man, but to his whole nature, drawing sustenance from volition and sentiment no less than from reason. In other words, a marked movement is traceable away from formal metaphysics and in the direction of psychological and historical investigation. Like all reactions, this one has run too far. For history and psychology have their necessary metaphysical implications, and these cannot be neglected.

Yet, in this very disparagement of metaphysics in the interest of history and psychology lie at once the hope for the future and the transition character of the contemporary attitude. Professor Sabatier's book is supremely interesting, because it indicates, better than any other work with which I am acquainted, the processes now in progress. Its limitations, like its value, center in its non-metaphysical nature, and in its effort to heighten the importance of psychology and history. Suggestion marks its every page; evidence of grasp is by no means so easily found.

The plan of the work obviously indicates what may be termed its sporadic character. After a preface, in which the incoherence of philosophy of religion under the metaphysical *régime* is emphasized and the need for sober history and psychology noted, Professor Sabatier proceeds to attack his problem along three main lines. His First Book treats of Religion, and is subdivided into four chapters—on the Psychological Origin of Religion; Religion and Revelation; Miracle

and Inspiration ; and the Religious Development of Mankind. The Second Book is entitled Christianity, and the subject-matter falls into three chapters—Hebraism or the Origin of the Gospel; the Essence of Christianity; and the Principal Historical Forms of Christianity. The closing book, with the title Dogma, contains four chapters—What is Dogma? the Life of Dogmas and their Historical Evolution; the Science of Dogmas; and a Critical Theory of Religious Knowledge. It is a curious collocation of themes, and very well serves to show the somewhat chaotic conception of the author in regard to the precise aim of philosophy of religion. For this reason, too, the treatment possesses that flexibility and fluidity so admirably suited to the present situation.

Four lines of thought converge in the book—the theological, historical, psychological, and philosophical. The value of the work done upon each is very different. The theological positions are much the strongest. The chapters on Miracle and Inspiration, on Hebraism, on the Essence of Christianity, and all the sections on Dogma are excellent. They display competent knowledge, eminent fairness and scientific appreciation, and many of their suggestions are full of insight. The historical *Ueberblicke* are often most stimulating, and are invariably marked by great freshness. The consideration of the Religious Development of Mankind, of the Principal Historical Forms of Christianity, and of the Evolution of Christian Dogma in History, affords ample evidence of a certain happy valiancy that shakes one out of all ordinary ruts. The same praise cannot be conscientiously bestowed upon the psychological and philosophical portions. The psychological facts on which the argument is based are far too general. So much is this so that the method often recalls metaphysical *a priorism* against which the author protests. And redaction in the interest of a preconceived psychological scheme is just as objectionable as that set forth for the purpose of aggrandizing a metaphysical theory. The weakest part of the work is the purely philosophical portion;—the concluding chapter on the Nature of Religious Knowledge. Here Professor Sabatier makes most dangerous admissions, and employs arguments which are conspicuously double-edged. He appears to have been seriously affected by Ritschlianism, and this to such an extent that, if his contentions were true, they would entirely preclude the possibility of anything in the nature of *philosophy* of religion. Bookkeeping by double entry has no place in the accounting of human experience.

Throughout the book is written in that limpid style peculiar to the French; its objectivity forms its most attractive characteristic; it

is the style that puts the Germans to shame and makes English writers despair. Everyone interested in the subject ought to procure the volume, not expecting a systematic philosophy of religion, but a series of suggestions, enlivening in themselves, and raising several problems that have hitherto received too scanty attention. I am glad to notice that a second edition has already been called for. A full index would be a welcome addition.

R. M. WENLEY.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By FRANK BYRON JEVONS, M.A., LITT.D. London: Methuen & Co., 1897. Pp. vii + 443; cloth. 10s. 6d.

THIS introduction to the history of religion deserves high commendation for its modesty, impartiality of tone, and suggestiveness. Though pretending to be little more than a compilation from authorities on anthropology, it really is—from the discriminating use of its material and the philosophical power of the author—an original and valuable contribution to the study of early religion, and therefore to the study of all religion. In studying any subject we must begin at the beginning. It bears, too, on those large problems, raised by biblical introduction, which are to be solved neither by the old dogmatism which rested on uncritical tradition nor by the new and sometimes snuffy dogmatism of modern literary criticism. Both of these dogmatisms have done good service in their time; but the time has come for something better. A patient and thorough investigation of all the facts is now demanded. That is being carried on, but much labor is still needed to complete the work. Clearly, too, no other method but the comparative can be used to ascertain wherein the things investigated—whether religions or anything else—resemble each other and wherein they differ. For though some who are rightly reluctant to appear to compromise the exclusive claims of Christianity are jealous of a method which to them implies that all religions are alike, they must on consideration admit that, just as comparative philology implies that languages differ from each other and comparative anatomy implies that animals differ in structure, so the use of the comparative method in the study of religions “is a standing disproof of the idea that all religions are alike.” “The comparative method can only be used where there are differences in the things compared. Indeed, we may go further and say that it is